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Abstract  
In this article the applicability of the concept of consent is examined in rape cas-
es where the complainant is voluntarily intoxicated. Consent has been at the core 
of the offence of rape in England for quite some time and the applicability of the 
concept in such cases in England is examined. The article argues that the concept 
of consent has not been adequately able to address cases of voluntary intoxica-
tion in England, demonstrating that the concept of consent is particularly prob-
lematic when it comes to such cases, both due to its ambiguous meaning and its 
subjective nature. It is furthermore argued that a coercion-based definition of 
rape, which the Nordic countries have all until recently adhered to, may provide 
for a more workable yardstick in cases of voluntary intoxication. The recent in-
troduction of a consent-based definition of rape in Swedish and Icelandic law is 
examined along with how it applies to cases of voluntary intoxication. The article 
concludes that although both Sweden and Iceland have recently amended their 
rape laws as to include consent-based definitions of rape, both countries have in 
effect adhered to a coercion-based model when it comes to cases of voluntary in-
toxication, relying on yardsticks focusing on the physical. 
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Introduction 
While the introduction of the concept of consent in rape laws in the Nordic coun-
tries is a very recent construct, the concept of consent has been at the core of the 
offence of rape in certain other legal jurisdictions for quite some time. This is the 
case for England; rape in English law is defined as intentional penetration of the 
vagina, anus or mouth of another person with the perpetrators penis without con-
sent and without reasonably belief of consent (Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 1). In 
this article I examine the applicability of the concept of consent in cases of volun-
tary complainant intoxication. Intoxication is a common feature in rape cases; a 
considerable number of both defendants and complainants have taken drink prior 
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to the offence (Cowan, 2008, p. 904). I examine how English law addresses rape 
when the complainant is intoxicated; in particular, how the general definition of 
consent included in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (hereafter referred to as ’SOA 
2003’) has been applied to cases where complainants have been voluntarily intox-
icated during the act (hereafter referred to as ’voluntary intoxication’). My argu-
ment is that the general definition of consent has not been adequately able to ad-
dress cases of voluntary intoxication, at least, not how it has been interpreted by 
the English courts. I furthermore argue that the concept of consent is particularly 
problematic when it comes to voluntary intoxication, both due to its ambiguous 
meaning and its subjective nature. A coercion-based model may have an im-
portant advantage over a consent-based model in cases of voluntary intoxication 
whereas its primary focus is not on the complainant’s mental capabilities at a cer-
tain point of drunkenness but rather on how the complainant’s physical capabili-
ties are impaired. My conclusion is that if consent is to be relied on in such cases 
the law should be amended to provide a clearer legislative guidance as to when a 
complainant’s intoxication negates consent, focusing on the physical effects of 
intoxication on the complainant. I then move on to examine the legal position of 
the Nordic countries when it comes to cases of voluntary intoxication with special 
regard to recent legal developements in Sweden and Iceland. I study how these 
countries have introduced consent-based definitions of rape in connection to vol-
untary intoxication and compare this to my previous findings regarding English 
law. I conclude that although both Sweden and Iceland have recently implement-
ed a consent-based model both countries have in effect adhered to a coercion-
based model when it comes to cases of voluntary intoxication, thus adhering to 
yardsticks focusing on the physical. 
The Definition of Consent in English Law – SOA 2003 
The aim of the English government to clarify the law on rape by setting out a 
clear and unambiguous statutory definition of consent is clear from the Home Of-
fice Report Setting the Boundaries that became the base of SOA 2003. Setting the 
Boundaries argued that an ambiguous and broad concept of consent risks being 
interpreted in an inconsistent manner from case to case and that the law should be 
reformed to include a clear concept of consent based on a free agreement between 
two equals, who both have the capacity to make that choice, rather than one sub-
mitting to the will of another (Home Office, 2000, paras 2.2.3 and 2.4.2; Sjölin, 
2015, pp. 22, 34; R v Olugboja [1982] QB 320, para 332). The report proposed 
that this should be done through a two-tiered approach, including a statutory def-
inition of consent and a list of non-exhaustive list of circumstances when consent 
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or free agreement is not present (Home Office, 2000, Recommendation 5 and pa-
ra 2.10.6). The Report envisaged the list as a starting point but considered that the 
courts would develop the law further by applying the general definition of con-
sent to other circumstances than those captured by the list (Home Office, 2000, 
para 2.10.7). The structure of the SOA 2003 is largely based on the proposals, al-
beit with some changes. The act includes a general consent based definition of 
rape and an exhaustive list of presumptions that describe circumstances where 
there is an assumed lack of consent. In proving rape the prosecution can thus ei-
ther prove that one of the irrebuttable1 or rebuttable2 presumptions is present or, if 
none of these circumstances are present, to prove that there was nonetheless a 
lack of consent, thus basing the case on the general definition of consent (SOA 
2003, s 74).  
 While two of the (rebuttable) presumptions can be applicable in cases where 
the complainant is intoxicated they are only applicable to a limited number of 
cases, i.e. where the complainant is unconscious (SOA 2003, s. 75(2)(d)) or 
where another person had administered a substance to the complainant, capable 
of causing the complainant to be overpowered or stupefied (SOA 2003, s. 
75(2)(f)). The focus here will not be on these presumptions but rather on the gen-
eral definition of consent, which is relied on in cases when the complainant is 
voluntarily intoxicated but not to the point of having lost consciousness. The gen-
eral definition of consent in SOA 2003 is as follows: ’A person consents if he 
agrees by choice, and has the freedom and capacity to make that choice’ (SOA 
2003, s. 74). It is thus put in the hands of the courts to direct juries in interpreting 
and applying the concepts of ’choice’, ’freedom’ and ’capacity’, and in the pro-
cess, give jury directions that challenge what can be viewed as ’stereotypical 
thinking’ (Temkin and Ashworth, 2003, p. 333). The following chapter will ex-
amine how the general definition of consent has been applied in cases of volun-
tary intoxication in England. 
 
1. The circumstances that lead to an irrebuttable presumption of non-consent are circumstances 
where the defendant has used deception, either as to the nature of purpose of the sexual act (s. 
76(2)(a)) or by impersonating someone personally known to the complainant (s. 76(2)(b)). 
2. The circumstances that presume that consent was not given, but where this presumption is 
rebuttable, involve violence or the threat of immediate violence against the complainant (s. 
75(2)(a)) or another person (s. 75(2)(b)), circumstances where the complainant is unlawfully 
detained (s. 75(2)(c)), asleep or unconscious (s. 75(2)(d)), unable to communicate consent 
due to physical disability (s. 75(2)(e)) or is involuntarily intoxicated (s. 75(2)(f)). 
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The Application of the SOA 2003 in Cases of Voluntary Intoxication 
R v Bree (R v Bree [2007] EWCA Crim 804) is considered a landmark ruling re-
garding the interpretation of SOA 2003 in cases of voluntary intoxication. In Bree 
the defendant was convicted but the judgement was squashed on appeal whereas 
the jury was considered to have lacked proper direction as to the impact of the 
complainant’s intoxication on her capacity to consent and whether they could al-
so take that in account in deciding whether she consented (R v Bree [2007] EW-
CA Crim 804, para 39). The complainant had shortly before the sexual act thrown 
up repeatedly and had been ’taken care of’ by the defendant. According to the 
complainant herself, she had lost consciousness, while the defendant held that the 
complainant had been conscious and had consented by reacting positively to his 
advances and removed her clothes (R v Bree [2007] EWCA Crim 804, paras 6-9, 
13-18). The prosecution initially based its case on the complainant’s lack of ca-
pacity to consent due to her being unconscious but then revised its case and stated 
that the complainant had been conscious and thus retained the capacity to consent 
but did not consent whereas her ability to resist the defendant was hampered (R v 
Bree [2007] EWCA Crim 804, para 20). The judge’s words in R v Dougal,3 an-
other landmark case of voluntary intoxication (where the jury was instructed by 
the trial judge to find the defendant not guilty, whereas the complainant claimed 
that she could not remember whether she consented or not, due to intoxication), 
that ’drunken consent is still consent’ were considered by the Appeals Court in 
Bree to accurately describe the legal position although lacking delicacy (R v Bree 
[2007] EWCA Crim 804, paras 30-32). 
 While the Appeals Court in R. v. Bree acknowledged that the capacity to con-
sent could disappear before the complainant became unconscious (R v Bree 
[2007] EWCA Crim 804, para 34) it has been criticised for offering limited guid-
ance as to what yardstick should be applied in determining when intoxication 
reaches the level of making a person incapable og consenting to sexual acts 
(Elvin, 2008, pp. 523-525) and furthermore not applying the principle that it es-
tablished but rather, in line with Dougal, takes factual consent as legal consent 
(Wallerstein, 2009, p. 321). This criticism has some merit to it; the Appeals Court 
in Bree distinguished the ’critical aspect of the case’ as the issue whether the 
complainant might have behaved differently when drunk and thus behaved as the 
 
3. In R v Dougal the jury was instructed by the trial judge to find the defendant not guilty, 
whereas the complainant claimed that she could not remember whether she consented or not, 
due to intoxication. 
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defendant held (R v Bree [2007] EWCA Crim 804, para 42) (i.e. leading him on), 
but did not address the issue directly whether the complainant’s intoxication 
might have rendered her incapable to consent. In R v Hysa (R v Hysa [2007] 
EWCA Crim 2056), the Appeals Court, however, applied the principle estab-
lished in Bree that the capacity to consent could evaporate due to intoxication 
while the complainant was still conscious (Wallerstein, 2009, p. 322; Simpson, 
2016, p. 113).4 However, like in Bree, little guidance was offered as to what yard-
stick should be applied in determining when intoxication reaches the level of 
making a person incapable of consenting to sexual acts (Elvin, 2008, pp. 523-
527).  
 So what guidance can this case law offer when it comes to determining when 
a complainant is not capable of consenting due to intoxication? There seems to be 
a widespread consensus that the SOA 2003 has failed to achieve the clarity that 
the Government aimed for in cases of voluntary intoxication, both to a lack of le-
gal clarity (Elvin, 2008, pp. 535) and adequate jury direction (Cowan, 2008, p. 
921; Temkin and Ashworth, 2003; Simpson, 2016, p. 110). The law set out in 
Bree, Dougal and Hiya has furthermore been criticised for being too restrictive, 
in that even if the complainant is extremely intoxicated factual consent is pre-
sumed to be legal consent and because an extremely high level of intoxication is 
required before the issue of capacity to consent is put into question (Cowan, 
2008, pp. 914-915; Wallerstein, 2009, p. 322-323). The courts seem to have ad-
hered to the position that the capacity to consent is not compromised unless the 
complainant is extremely intoxicated; in R v Kamki (R v Kamki [2013] EWCA 
Crim 2335) the judge’s directions relating to the capacity to consent focused on 
whether the complainant had lost a certain degree of consciousness, with the 
judge directing the jury that “In a state of dim and drunken awareness, a person 
may not be in a condition to make choices”. The judgement is referred to in the 
The Crown Court Compendium (Judicial College, 2019) as guidance to judges 
when summing up cases in the Crown Court in cases of voluntary intoxication 
(Judicial College, 2019, p. 20-21). A certain level of unconsciousness has thus 
become the yardstick that is applied in cases of voluntary intoxication, requiring a 
very high level of intoxication before questioning the capacity to consent. Con-
sciousness is thus considered to translate into a complainant being capable to 
 
4. It has since been established that the fact that the complainant does not remember whether 
she consented or not due to memory loss, is an independent issue from the capacity to con-
sent, R v Seedy Tambedou [2014] EWCA Crim 954, para 16. 
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consent, even in cases where complainants have held that they were so drunk that 
they vomited, cannot remember the events or remember not wanting sex and feel 
that they were unable to resist physically because of intoxication (Cowan, 2008, 
pp. 914-915).  
 The question arises whether there is need for a legal clarification that further-
more moves from the narrow judicial interpretation of capacity to consent in cas-
es of voluntary intoxication. While some have advocated for legislative amend-
ments, others have considered that detailed jury directions would be sufficient to 
clarify the legal situation (Home Office, 2000, Recommendation 7, para 2.11; 
Cowan, 2008, p. 921; Sjölin, 2015, p. 30; Wallerstein, 2009, p. 343-344). Andrew 
Ashworth considers that in cases of voluntary intoxication judges should direct 
juries to assess capacity in terms of the complainants’ awareness and understand-
ing of the situation and ability to make the choice (Ashworth, 2007, p. 903). The 
Crown Court Compendium reflects this to some extent; in applying s 74 of SOA 
2003, the courts should look to whether the complainant’s understanding and 
knowledge is so limited that she cannot decide whether to agree to the act (Judi-
cial College, p. 20-21). The assessment of the complainant’s capacity to consent, 
however, continues to be left to the common sense of juries. This has been held to 
lead to inconsistencies in the application of the law and to be effected by gender 
stereotypes (Cowan, 2008, p. 911-912; Home Office, 2000, para 2.2.3; Simpson, 
2016, p. 112-114; Finch and Munro, 2007, p. 599). It follows that while the gen-
eral definition of consent in the SOA 2003 might allow for a more drastic inter-
pretation (Wallerstein, 2009, p. 343-344), legislative changes seem to be inevita-
ble if the capacity to consent is to be approached in a different manner than the 
English courts have done. The issue that remains is the question whether the law 
can provide further guidance when assessing the capacity to consent. In Bree, Sir 
Igor Judge commented that the issue of capacity to consent in cases of voluntary 
intoxication is simply an area ’inapt from detailed legislative structure’ whereas 
the law cannot through a ’grid system’ determine that a certain level of alcohol 
consumption leaves a person incapable to consent (R v Bree [2007] EWCA Crim 
804, paras 34-36). This sentiment – that the law simply cannot provide a test ap-
plicable to these circumstances – seems to be shared by many (Cowan, 2008, p. 
911; Ashworth, 2007, p. 903; Scottish Law Commission, 2007, para 2.63.). 
While I do not suggest that this is a simple thing to address, Sir Igor Judge’s rea-
soning seems to be largely based on a very narrow view on how the law can ad-
dress cases of voluntary intoxication. It seems that there are various other ways to 
address the issue of rape where the complainant is severely intoxicated than in-
troducing rules based on the number of alcohol units that she has consumed. The 
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way that the law may address these circumstances will be the subject of the fol-
lowing chapters. 
Clarifying the Meaning of Consent in Cases of Voluntary Intoxication 
How can the law assess whether a severely intoxicated person was to make a 
choice at a certain point? Shlomit Wallerstein argues that once a woman has 
reached the point of intoxication that she acts out of character and can no longer 
say ’no’, she has become incapable of a free choice to say ’yes’ (Wallerstein, 
2009, p. 333). While it seems logical that if a person cannot say ’no’ she can not 
choose, assessing a person’s inability of saying ’no’ is not an easy task. While 
Wallerstein refers to a woman acting out of character in this context it seems that 
the yardstick of altered behaviour is highly problematic. Some people may act 
quite out of character after consuming alcohol without being severely intoxicated. 
Furthermore, there seems to be a widespread consensus that a distinction must be 
made between intoxication resulting in a lack of capacity to consent on one hand 
and intoxication that alters a person’s choices on the other, due to the disinhibit-
ing effect of alcohol.5 Drawing the line between these two scenarios seems to be 
at the heart of the issue of determining when a person loses her capacity to con-
sent due to intoxication. So where does the line lie between a ’bad’ choice – in-
cluding a choice that a person may never have made sober – and the incapacity to 
make a choice?  
 Sharon Cowan argues that the law should be amended as to consider consent 
in a state of ’extreme drunkenness’ as non-consent, or at least that consent in such 
circumstances should be presumed not to be present (Cowan, 2008, p. 921). 
Cowan proposes that the inability to speak or move, vomiting, periods of uncon-
sciousness and memory loss should all suggest that there is a lack of capacity to 
consent, unless the defendant shows that the complainant did have the capability 
to consent and did so (Cowan, 2008, p. 917). What Cowan is in fact suggesting, is 
that the physical effects of extreme drunkenness be used as a yardstick to assess 
its subjective effects, i.e. on the complainant’s capacity to consent. This brings us 
to the fundamental issue of evidence. The clearest evidence of a state of extreme 
drunkenness tends to demonstrate its physical impact. Evidence of the complain-
 
5. This has been the position of the Appeals Court as has been the subject of the preceding 
chapter. This position is also reflected in the 2016 Consultation Paper Convicting Rapists 
and Protecting Victims – Justice for Victims of Rape, that recommended that the legal defini-
tion of consent be clarified. Office for Criminal Justice Reform, 2016, p. 14. 
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ant’s memory loss, difficulties of walking, being sick and reaching a level of 
helplessness seems to be prevalent in cases of voluntary intoxication. On the oth-
er hand evidence as to the complainant’s level of understanding and knowledge 
(to use Ashworth’s guidance) at the moment of sexual intercourse is generally 
limited – both due to the fact that evidence of the physical is generally easier to 
come by than evidence of the subjective, and also because in cases of rape evi-
dence of the complainant’s mental capabilities at the moment of the sexual act are 
particularly difficult to come by due to the nature of the offence; generally the on-
ly witness to the complainant’s mental capabilities at that moment is the defend-
ant. The subjective nature of the concept of consent, therefore, seems to be par-
ticularly problematic in cases of voluntary intoxication.  
The Subjective Nature of Consent and Evidence of Voluntary Intoxication 
Legal systems and commentators alike differ in whether consent is or should be 
defined as purely subjective or whether its expression should be objectively 
formed (Ferzan and Westen, 2017, pp. 777-778). However, while consent is pri-
marily a subjective concept, rape trials often revolve around analysing the behav-
iour and bodily responses of the complainant (Cowan, 2008, p. 903). This con-
nects to the aforementioned evidential difficulties when assessing a subjective 
concept; in the absence of evidence of the mental capabilities of the complainant, 
evidence of the physical is used to try to assess the subjective. The role of consent 
in cases of rape is, in fact, widely considered to result in severe scrutiny of the 
complainants’ actions and that this scrutiny may accentuate stereotypical views of 
jurors (Finch and Munro, 2007, p. 606; Tadros, 2006, pp. 516-517). It has been 
held that a consent-based offence of rape may thus be particularly sensitive to the 
prejudices of trial participants and furthermore, due to its ambiguous nature, sus-
ceptible to manipulation by the defence (Tadros, 2006, pp. 516-517). With regard 
to the evidence of the public’s perception of intoxicated rape victims (Cowan, 
2008, pp. 911-912; Simpson, 2016, pp. 112-114; Finch and Munro, 2007, p. 599), 
these arguments against a consent-based model seem to carry particular weight 
when it comes to cases of voluntary intoxication (Munro, 2011, p. 20).  
 In comparison, rape laws based on coercion or the use of force in a broad 
sense have been considered to have the advantage of focusing on the defendant’s 
actions, rather than on the consent of the complainant and thus sparing the com-
plainant to be ’put on trial’ (Ferzan and Westen, 2017, pp. 773). The coercion-
based model, furthermore, has an important advantage over a consent-based 
model in cases of intoxication; its primary focus is not on the complainant’s men-
tal capabilities at a certain point of drunkenness. Rather, the focus is on how the 
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complainant’s physical capabilities are impaired. A coercion-based offence may, 
therefore, offer clearer legislative guidance as to the effects of voluntary intoxica-
tion in cases of rape than the consent-based model, especially when the latter type 
of offence offers no guidance as to what can be deduced about the complainant’s 
capacity to consent from the evidence of the physical effects of intoxication. An 
examination of the law on rape in the Nordic countries, who have all up until re-
cently adhered to a coercion-based model, might provide an illustrative example 
of this.  
The Legal Position of the Nordic Countries – Cases of Voluntary 
Intoxication and Consent 
In Norway (s 291(b) of the Norwegian penal code (Lov om straff LOV-2005-05-
20-28), Denmark (s 216(1)(2) of the Danish penal code (Straffeloven no. 
1156/2018) and Iceland (s 194(2) of the Icelandic penal code (Almenn hegningar-
lög no. 19/1940)) the provisions that have generally been applied in cases of vol-
untary intoxication stipulates that rape is committed when a person cannot resist 
the sexual advances of another (or understand its meaning), while the Finnish (ch 
20 s 1(2) of the Finnish penal code (Rikoslaki no. 39/1889))6 and Swedish7 provi-
sions have both up until recently relied on an offence that stipulates that engaging 
in a sexual act with a person by exploiting her vulnerable or helpless state is rape. 
It may be argued that not being able to resist something or being vulnerable or 
helpless are concepts that can be manipulated or interpreted in a narrow manner 
just like the concept of consent. However, the fact that these concepts focus on 
the physical capabilities of the complainant rather than their cognitive capabilities 
might make their application easier in cases of voluntary intoxication. Sweden 
and Iceland have, at least, decided against relying on a general definition of con-
sent in cases of voluntary intoxication although both countries have recently im-
plemented a consent-based model of rape. The rationale behind this approach will 
be the subject of this chapter. 
 In 2018 Sweden implemented a consent-based definition of rape (ch 6 s 1 of 
the Swedish penal code (Brottsbalken no. 1962:700). It should, however, be not-
ed that the final legal amendments did not include the concept of consent, but ra-
 
6. The Finnish penal provision also refers to the person being unable to defend himself or her-
self og express his or her will. 
7. Before the 2018 changes that will be the subject of this chapter the applicable offence was ch 
6 s 3 of the Swedish penal code (Brottsbalken no. 1962:700). 
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ther the concept of voluntariness (“frivillighet”) the reason for this being that the 
concept of consent already has a place in the Swedish penal code as a defence, 
absolving the defendant of criminal liability (Regeringens proposition, 2017, p. 
30). In spite of this, the preparatory documents refer to the law as being based on 
consent and it is generally referred to as the consent-law (“samtyckeslagen”) 
(Vestergaard 2019, p. 279; Regeringens proposition, 2017, p. 22; Statens offen-
tliga utredningar, 2016, p. 125). Before the law was passed in 2018 there were 
widespread concerns in Sweden that due to the ambiguous meaning of consent, 
people’s sexual autonomy would be afforded less protection if the current offence 
of rape in Swedish law would be replaced by a consent-based offence (Statens 
offentliga utredningar, 2016, p. 180). To meet these concerns, the Committee ap-
pointed by the Swedish Parliament, that proposed introducing a consent-based 
model of rape into Swedish law, suggested that the consent-based model should 
include irrebuttable legal presumptions to better capture cases of complainant in-
toxication (Statens offentliga utredningar, 2016, pp. 201-202). The amendments 
to the Swedish criminal code that were passed in 2018 include legal presumptions 
that stipulate that a person can never be considered to be participating voluntarily 
in sexual intercourse or in a comparable sexual act when the defendant has im-
properly taken advantage of a person who is in a particularly vulnerable situation 
inter alia due to intoxication or other drug influence (ch 6 s 1 of Brottsbalken no. 
1962:700). The Swedish coercion-based offence applicable to cases of intoxica-
tion is thus retained (albeit with some changes) but placed within the context of 
consent (voluntariness), so as to ensure that the protection of intoxicated com-
plainants would not diminish with the introduction of a consent-based offence of 
rape (Statens offentliga utredningar, 2016, p. 137; Burman, 2011, p. 209).  
 Iceland, on the other hand, opted for a mixed model when amending the Ice-
landic penal code’s rape provision in 2018 (Article 194 of the Icelandic penal 
code (Almenn hegningarlög nr. 19/1940), by both adopting a consent-based of-
fence of rape and also retaining the former offence of rape that is not based on 
consent but grounded on the yardstick of the complainant being unable to resist 
the defendant. The reasoning behind retaining this coercion-based offence of rape 
is, according to the preparatory documents accompanying the proposal to intro-
duce a consent-based type of offence in Iceland, simply that in instances where 
the victim cannot resist or comprehend the sexual act, consent does not have any 
’significance’ because of the victim’s state (Alþingi, 2017-2018, p. 9). Albeit this 
limited argumentation, it is clear that the position of the Icelandic legislator is that 
the yardstick of being unable to resist sexual advances is more suitable in cases of 
voluntary intoxication than the concept of consent. This offence has been applied 
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in cases of extreme intoxication comparable to Bree, i.e. where the complainant 
has been intoxicated to the point of being sick and has been ’taken care of’ by the 
defendant who has then had intercourse with the complainant (Iceland’s Supreme 
Court Judgements no. 644/2015 and 252/2016). The physical effects of intoxica-
tion, i.e. the complainant’s ability to physically resist the defendant, seem to pro-
vide for a more ’workable’ yardstick than consent in these circumstances. The 
fact that the prosecution in Bree tried to use this criterion, claiming that due to the 
complainant’s intoxication her ability to resist the defendant was hampered (R v 
Bree [2007] EWCA Crim 804), seems to provide an illustrative example of this. 
Gardner might be regarded as another example of a case where a focus on the 
complainant’s physical abilities would have provided clearer guidance than the 
concept of consent; it seems clear that under the circumstances the complainant, 
who was vomiting and unable to answer, was not in a position to resist the ad-
vances of the defendant (R v Gardner [2005] EWCA Crim 1399). 
 Although Sweden and Iceland are the only Nordic countries that have amend-
ed their rape laws as to include consent-based definitions of rape at the time of 
writing the other Nordic countries have also considered adapting their rape laws 
to include a consent-based provision. In Finland and Norway, the issue of the in-
troduction of consent-based legislation is still being debated (Vestergaard 2019, 
p. 278; Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2019, p. 50) while Denmark is in the 
process of implementing a consent-based model of rape. In line with the Swedish 
legal amendments that have been the subject of this chapter the legal amendments 
proposed by the majority of the Danish Penal Committee (Straffelovrådet) are 
based on the concept of voluntariness rather than consent (Justitsministeriet 2020, 
p. 174). The Danish Penal Committee, however, states that the two concepts are 
more or less identical (“sammenfaldende”) (Justitsministeriet 2020, p. 14). The 
proposal put forward by the majority of the Committee is largely in line with the 
Swedish legal amendments, with the legal proposal placing Denmark’s coercion-
based offence currently applicable in cases of intoxication within the context of 
consent (Justitsministeriet 2020, p. 174). The applicability of a consent-based def-
inition of rape in cases of voluntary intoxication thus continues to be a highly rel-
evant topic in the Nordic countries. 
The Approach to Consent in England, Sweden and Iceland in Cases of 
Voluntary Intoxication – Providing Legislative Guidance as to when 
Intoxication Negates the Capacity to Consent 
My previous conclusion is that the concept of consent alone is not a viable tool to 
assess cases of complainant intoxication, as I have argued the legal position in 
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England has demonstrated. The question thus arises whether the consent-based 
model should be departed from or whether it should be amended to counteract the 
difficulties of proving an intoxicated person’s mental capability at a certain mo-
ment in time? While Sweden has attempted to address the shortcomings of the 
concept of consent through irrebuttable legal presumptions in an attempt to pro-
vide clearer legislative guidance as to when a complainant’s intoxication negates 
her consent, Iceland seems to have rejected the concept of consent as the base of 
the offence of rape in cases of complainant intoxication. It could be argued that in 
practice the position of these two countries might in effect by quite similar; while 
Sweden places cases of complainant intoxication within the umbrella of consent 
it adheres to the yardstick previously applicable in such cases – just like Iceland. 
The interpretation of these provisions are, of course, dependent on the courts of 
these two countries and at the time of writing the effect of the introduction of 
consent-based rape provisions on rape cases in Sweden and Iceland is still some-
what unclear (Justitsministeriet, 2020, pp. 81, 102; Vestergaard, 2019, p. 285, 
Brå, 2020).8 While the legal effect of these two different approaches remain to be 
seen, the question might be asked whether placing cases of voluntary intoxication 
under the umbrella of consent or not makes any difference in terms of labelling. 
 While some have argued for a departure from a consent-based offence of rape 
(Tadros, 2006; Munro, 2011, p. 21), the general view seems to be that consent 
best captures the wrong committed by rape, i.e. the violation of a person’s sexual 
autonomy (Home Office, 2000, para 2.7.2). The Icelandic approach might give 
the impression that there are two distinct wrongs committed by creating one con-
sent-based offence and one coercion-based offence of rape, with the latter offence 
based on a misrepresentation of the nature of the wrong (Munro, 2011, p. 26). In 
 
8. According to initial reports the introduction of a consent-based rape provision has not neces-
sarily had much effect on rape convictions in general in Sweden and Iceland (Justitsminister-
iet, 2020, pp. 81, 102; Vestergaard, 2019, p. 285). However, according to a report published 
by the Swedish government agency Brå in June 2020, there has been a signficant increase in 
prosecutions and convictions of rape cases in Sweden in general since the legal amendments 
came into action (Brå, 2020, p. 82). Although it is too early to draw any final conclusions 
based on this increase (Brå, 2020, p. 82), a number of prosecutors in Sweden seem to be of 
the opinion that the legal amendments have had an impact on cases of complainant intoxica-
tion whereas they have allowed judges more flexibility in interpreting the meaning of an es-
pecially vulnerable situation, allowing them to take into account the circumstances as a 
whole, even if the complainant was not necessarily drunk to the point of passing out (alt-
hough judges in Sweden don’t necessarily seem to agree with this assumption) (Brå, 2020, 
pp. 72-73). 
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line with this, a consent-based offence could be viewed as a better alternative to 
navigate the issue of consent in cases of voluntary intoxication. If consent is to be 
relied on the law should, however, be amended to provide a clearer legislative 
guidance as to when a complainant’s intoxication negates her consent than Eng-
land has done, preferably focusing on the physical effects of intoxication on the 
complainant. The Swedish position of introducing an irrebuttable legal presump-
tion based on a defendant improperly using a person who is in a particularly vul-
nerable situation inter alia due to intoxication or other drug influence is only one 
of many possible ways that this might be addressed. 
 However, it seems that the legislative amendments necessary to clarify con-
sent and make it workable in cases of voluntary intoxication must in any case of-
fer some actual legislative guidance when assessing what the effect of the com-
plainant’s level of intoxication is on her capability to consent. A legal presump-
tion that would merely refer to the complainant being ’too affected by alcohol or 
drugs to give free agreement’, as was suggested in Setting the Boundaries (Home 
Office, 2000, Recommendation 6 and para 2.10.9) seems to add little to the gen-
eral definition of consent (Cowan, 2011, p. 162). Instead, the law should provide 
for a yardstick against which the physical effects of severe intoxication can be 
measured and on that basis, the complainant’s capacity to consent can be as-
sessed. This could be done by introducing a legal presumption along the lines of 
what Cowan suggests, where consent is considered not to be present if the com-
plainant has lost certain physical capabilities. This could also be done by using 
the yardstick, applied in the Nordic countries, of the complainant’s physical state 
becoming so weakened that she has lost the ability to resist sexual advances or 
that she is in a helpless or vulnerable state that is exploited by the defendant. 
These yardsticks can be transformed into legal presumptions as Sweden has done. 
Conclusion 
While the limitations of consent-based offences of rape in general, and the gen-
eral definition of consent in the SOA 2003 in particular, might be regarded as 
primarily due to the English courts’ narrow interpretation of consent, legal clari-
fication seems to be necessary at this point if a departure is to be made for the 
narrow and somewhat unclear interpretation of consent in cases of voluntary in-
toxication in English law. While the position of the English courts and the Eng-
lish government seems to be that the law cannot clarify the situation by setting 
out a test for assessing when an intoxicated person loses the capacity to consent, 
my conclusion is that the law can and should be clarified to better accommodate 
these cases. Whereas the evidence regarding a person’s state of drunkenness pri-
Nordisk Tidsskrift for Kriminalvidenskab 3/2020 
230 
marily pertains to the physical effects of intoxication, my argument is that the 
general definition of consent should be accompanied by a yardstick that focuses 
on these physical effects. This would make for a clearer and more workable of-
fence when it comes to assessing the effects of intoxication on a complainant’s 
capacity to consent. Admittedly, all types of offences rely on the courts’ applica-
tion and can thus be broadened or narrowed down through judicial interpretation. 
However, clarifying the law and providing the courts, defendants, complainants 
and the general public with a clearer direction as to where the boundaries be-
tween rape and consensual sexual behaviour lie, as was the aim of the SOA 2003, 
must be regarded as a step in the right direction. In contrast to England the Nordic 
countries have all up until recently adhered to a coercion-based model. Although 
Iceland and Sweden have both recently introduced consent-based definitions of 
rape both countries have, nonetheless, adhered to yardsticks that focus on the 
physical effects of intoxication rather than the capacity to consent in cases of vol-
untary intoxication. While Sweden has placed this yardstick under the umbrella 
of consent (voluntariness), Iceland has seemingly rejected the concept of consent 
as the base of the offence of rape in cases of voluntary intoxication. It remains to 
be seen whether these legislative amendments will lead to similar or different 
conclusions in practice. 
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